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1. Abstract 
 
Most countries have a system - procedures and tools - for foreseeable, clear and fair 
distribution of costs and profits in urban development.  
 
However, the distribution of profits and costs between the municipality and the developers 
/landowners is in Denmark rather fragmented and not very transparent as the distribution is 
regulated throughout the whole planning and environmental regulation system. Furthermore, 
development agreements – an “old” tool in many countries and an efficient tool to distribute 
profits and costs between the public and private sector – have only recently become possible 
in Denmark, and only under some special circumstances.  
 
This paper aims to clarify how costs and profits are distributed between the municipality and 
the developers /landowners in Denmark.  
 
The paper analyses how the Danish planning and environmental regulation system handles 
this issue. Based on the analysis an overview will be constructed. Finally, the paper discusses 
the Danish “distribution model”, and who holds the best ”set of cards” in the distribution of 
profits and costs in the urban development process. 
 
2. Introduction 
 
When a developer/landowner engages in an urban development project, he presumably does 
so with an aim of profit. The size of the profit – being the difference between the sale value 
and costs of producing the development project – will usually be influenced by both the 
present market situation and the size of production costs. It is therefore essential to the 
developer/landowner to know how the total development costs are split between the 
municipality and the developer/landowner.  
 
Like many other countries Denmark is considered a constitutional state. Among other things 
this means that the “principle of legality” as well as the “requirement of statutory authority” 
are fundamental principles in Denmark. Specifically local authorities are not allowed to 
collect taxes – or similarly, require financial contributions – without statutory authority. In 
connection to urban development and the distribution of profits and costs a municipality can 
only claim some of the profits and impose costs on the developer if it is an option given in 
Danish regulation.  
 
In several other countries there are quite well-functioning systems to handle “fair and 
transparent” distribution of profits and costs. The distribution of profits and costs between the 
municipality and the developers/landowners in Denmark can, however, more meaningful be  
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described as regulated in a quite “fragmented way”: Firstly, the distribution is regulated in 
many different acts throughout the whole “planning and environmental regulation system”. 
Secondly, in some cases distribution across public and private is not regulated at all, generally 
speaking. Together, this makes the distribution in Denmark rather fragmented and not very 
transparent.  
 
This paper offers a compiled overview of the distribution of profits and costs in Denmark. 
This is done through an analysis on how the Danish planning and environmental regulation 
system regulates the distribution in urban development.  
  
To analyse the distribution of profits and costs throughout the urban development process, the 
process is divided into five parts: A) Idea and throughout planning process, B) The supply of 
land, C) Site preparation and supply of physical infrastructure, D) The supply of social 
infrastructure and E) The construction of buildings. This division is not especially related to 
events or time, but related to how the Danish regulation handles the issue of distribution.  
 
3. Idea and throughout planning process 
 
It is broadly recognised theoretically as well as empirically1 that the value of agricultural land 
and the value of land designated for urban purposes are different, just as the value of a worn 
down industrial area usually is lower than the value of the area designated for high rise office 
buildings. It therefore implies that there is a value increase from the point in time where the 
development idea arises to the point where the municipality adopts the planning (binding local 
plan) that gives the landowners the right to develop the area in accordance with the plan.  
 
I connection with compulsory purchase the term “expectation value” is often discussed - in 
Denmark as in many other countries. The term concerns the increase in value that takes place 
before the local plan is adopted and is caused by the expectation of future development of the 
area2. (Kalbro, T, 2007) describes the expectation value as an upward sloping curve, meaning 
that as the development gets more and more certain the value increases. The municipality’s 
adoption of the local plan brings the value a step further up the ladder. It can be argued that 
this increase in value is “created by the society”, since the municipality does the planning and 
gives the possibility for development. (It is here taken as an assumption that the value 
increases, first caused by expectations and next created by the adoption of planning).  
 
There is no direct right in Danish regulation that gives the municipality any possibilities to 
claim some of the increased value from the landowner. However, the landowner pays tax of 
the value of land cf. Danish taxation law3, and the municipality receives this tax. The 
landowner also pays tax of the total property value, but this tax goes to the state. Thus, the 
                                                      
1 E.g. (Bramley, J., Bartlett, W., Lambert, C., 1995), (Kalbro, T, 2007), (Voss, W. & Dransfeld, E., 1993) and 
(Nielsen, Christensen and Pedersen 2005). 
2 That expectations of future usage possibilities have an influence on property value is also clearly stated in the 
new High Court verdict U.2008.2823H. In this verdict the land had no expectation value because the landowner 
– as a result of unbinding municipal planning – could not have any expectation to the future use of the land since 
it was to be used as public owned kindergarten. 
3 The Danish Property Tax Act (LBK nr. 724 af 26/06/2006) and The Danish Property Profit Margin Tax Act 
(LBK nr. 891 af 17/08/2006). 
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municipality gains some of the profit from the society-created value-increase, but it is 
insignificant on the whole. All things considered, the landowners get the profit.  
 
4. The supply of land 
 
Knowing that the landowner gains the profit – by and large – makes it interesting to look at; 
who is the landowner, and how does the ownership change? In other words – who owns the 
land when the value increases? This is important because it is the landowner at the time when 
the value increases that gets the profit caused by the society-created value-increase.  
 
When the purchase of land is between private people (or companies) they can in principle 
chose the price that they want to – higher or lower than marked price – to even out costs and 
profits, or to share profits. The setup is different when the municipality is either the buyer or 
seller. The municipality is not allowed, as private developers and landowners, to speculate in 
land, partly because it is not considered a municipality-task, and partly because it would be 
considered a distortion of the competition on the private property market. Therefore, 
municipalities are bound by a set of rules that – to put it briefly – commit municipalities to 
buy and sell property at market value, unless the municipality through buying land to prices 
higher than market price, or through selling land below marked price, can prove intentions of 
managing their interest in planning, environmental and infrastructural issues. This means that 
to ensure that the municipality spends its resources in the best interest of the municipality’s 
population the main purpose of the property purchase/sale must be different from earning 
money (Sørensen, M.T., 2007, p 272-275). Due to this municipalities have – also in this 
connection – very limited possibilities to obtain some of the profits that goes to the 
developer/landowner. 
 
No matter what, municipalities can – at least indirectly and as a side benefit – obtain profit on 
land development in connection with supplying the local community with building sites. A 
municipality can get ownership of land for urban development in three ways – all of which 
the land is acquired at market value: When the municipality buys land on market terms, 
compulsory purchase based on municipal plan and compulsory purchase based on local plan. 
(Sørensen, M.T., 2007, p 276-279) 
 
4.1 When the municipality buys land on market terms 
If the municipality and the landowner can agree on the market value of the land, the 
municipality can buy the land – like anyone else – to supply the local community with 
building sites. This is possible throughout the whole development process, and also before 
planning and development starts. The only limitation is that the municipality must buy land 
with some reference to their interest in planning, environmental and infrastructural issues and 
at market price. This way of acquiring land allows the municipality to become landowner 
before the value of land increases significantly.  
 
When an area has been planned either through municipal plan or local plan the sale conditions 
can change a bit as the planning (also) constitutes a necessary and legal prerequisite for using 
compulsory purchase (see further below). This means a great deal to the landowner since he is 
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exempted from paying tax of his earnings of the sale of the property4-5. In other words, if the 
landowner waits to sell until the land is planned he gets a “double benefit” since the land has a 
greater value and his earnings are exempted from tax. It could be argued – and a few 
municipalities have tried – to split the bonus from tax exemption between the landowner and 
the municipality. The court decisions on this issue have gone both ways, but recently the High 
Court made clear with its latest verdict – U.2008.1738V6 – that the tax exemption rules should 
only benefit the landowner and not the municipality.    
 
4.2 Compulsory purchase based on municipal plan 
The Danish Planning Act7 has two options concerning compulsory purchase for urban 
development. The first is based on the municipal plan – discussed here – and the second is 
based on the local plan, which is discussed below.  
 
When a piece of land is designated for urban purposes in a municipal plan the municipality 
can acquire land through compulsory purchase8. The municipality’s possibility to use 
compulsory purchase based on the municipal plan is restricted to agricultural land designated 
for urban purposes. If the municipality wants to use compulsory purchase in the existing city 
the municipality has to wait until there has been adopted a local plan for the area.  
 
Seen from an economical perspective, the land that the municipality wishes to acquire has 
most likely increased in value as a result of the expectations of future urban development. The 
value will probably increase further later on as the probability of development gets higher, 
and the binding local plan is adopted. Therefore, by expropriating based on a municipal plan 
the municipality can expect to get a substantial share of the increase in value that is caused by 
planning.  
 
4.3 Compulsory purchase based on local plan 
As mentioned above compulsory purchase based on local planning is the only option in the 
fully developed city area – other than free sale of course. The municipality’s possibility to do 
compulsory purchase based on local plan is the second compulsory purchase option in the 
Danish Planning Act9. It can also be used to acquire agricultural land as the possibility 
mentioned above.  
 
If the municipality waits until the local plan has been adopted, and thereby waits until the land 
is given new usage opportunities, the increase in value caused by the planning goes to the 
selling landowner. The municipality cannot get any part of it, due to the current valuation 
principles that gives the landowner full compensation, i.e. compensation of the property value 
including the value of building opportunities according to the binding local plan. 
 
                                                      
4 The Danish Property Profit Margin Tax Act (LBK nr. 891 af 17/08/2006) § 11. 
5 If the sold piece of land is for instance a cornfield, it is only the value of land that is tax free, the crops are not 
(Ensig J 2007, s 109-125). 
6 The verdict is about a municipality that through compulsory purchase acquires a piece of land to a future 
residential area from a farmer.    
7 The Danish Planning Act (LBK nr. 1027 af 20/10/2008). 
8 The Danish Planning Act (LBK nr. 1027 af 20/10/2008) § 47. 
9 The Danish Planning Act (LBK nr. 1027 af 20/10/2008) § 47. 
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4.4. When the municipality sells land on market terms 
When the municipality sells land – e.g. after expropriation - the land has to be sold at market 
price as a principal rule. This scenario is common in Denmark, where the municipality buys 
agricultural land, prepares the land, and sells the land as building plots for one-family houses. 
To secure a transparent sale process and sale at market price the municipality must (with a 
few exceptions) follow the rules of public procurement in advance10. There are detailed 
regulations on this issue in the legislation11. The few exceptions – explicit mention in detailed 
rules – on when public procurement can be avoided covers for instance sale between 
municipality and region or state.  
 
The municipality can in some exceptional cases sell its property for less than market value, it 
is however only possible if it is helping the municipality in serving its public interest in 
planning, environmental and infrastructural issues (Sørensen, M.T., 2007, p 275). 
 
5. Site preparation and supply of physical infrastructure 
 
When analysing the distribution of profits and costs throughout the preparation of land it is 
necessary to distinguish between: Preparation of the development area with regard to earlier 
land use, and preparation of the development area with regard to future land use. The reason 
for this distinction is that city areas often have to be cleaned-up due to polluted soil etc. before 
the traditional land preparation (water supply, sewage systems etc.) can be carried out. 
 
5.1. Preparation of the development area with regard to earlier land use 
The conditions caused by the prior use of land are a bit different depending whether the areas 
are existing urban areas like redevelopment areas or, on the other hand, agricultural land. 
Demolition of old buildings does mostly occur within the existing city. It is the 
developers/landowners that have the cost of this, and the same applies if there are trees, 
farming buildings etc. on agricultural land. There is however a couple of other important 
issues around the earlier land use; polluted soil and cultural heritage.  
 
Polluted soil can be a quite costly thing to get rid of. The Danish legislation on polluted soil12 
distinguishes between three different levels of soil; 1) Soil which is considered clean, 2) 
lightly polluted soil and 3) polluted soil (including soil mapped as polluted).  
 
Land with clean soil is “ready” to use, and if soil is to be moved away from the property the 
landowner only has to make sure that the soil is actually clean13 - and if it is not clean it is 
treaded as polluted soil as discussed below.  
 
In 2006 the term “lightly polluted soil” was introduced. It is an area classification of all urban 
zones (cities). The assumption is that city areas suffer from at least some pollution. Lightly 
polluted soil becomes a problem for the developer/landowner when he wants to move soil 
away from the property. If the soil is kept on the property he can continue as he has planned. 
                                                      
10 The Danish Act Governing the Municipality (LBK nr. 696 af 27/06/2008) § 68. 
11 Statutory order on public procurement when a municipality sells property (BEK nr. 472. af 20/06/1991) and 
Guidance on public procurement when a municipality sells property (VEJ nr. 60. af 28/06/2004). 
12 The Danish Act on Polluted Soil (LBK nr. 282 af 22/03/2007). 
13 The Danish Act on Polluted Soil (LBK nr. 282 af 22/03/2007) § 50. 
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When moving lightly polluted soil away from the property the developer/landowner must first 
of all report four weeks in advance that he wants to move the soil, and secondly he arrange a 
test of the soil at his own expense14. The costs of moving and handling polluted soil can be 
very costly, and developers/landowners cannot chose the method themselves (Moe, M; 
Lynæs, C. B and Krat, L. P., 2004, pp 144-145). If the soil has to be moved from the property 
it is handled as garbage. This means that the municipality assigns where to put it and what 
happens with the soil. (Basse, E. M., 2001, pp 257-258)  
 
Soil that is polluted or mapped as polluted15 is handled in the same way as lightly polluted soil 
when is leaves the property. There is, however, additional rules concerning polluted soil and 
soil mapped as polluted. In relation to urban development of polluted areas the important rule 
is that it requires a permit to change the use to “sensitive uses” like dwellings, summer 
houses, kindergartens and playgrounds for children.16 In such cases the municipality can – and 
usually does - make permits conditional on cleaning the polluted soil17.  
 
To secure that prehistoric settlements, graves and the like are not destroyed when areas are 
developed the Danish Museum Act18 regulates the handling of Danish cultural heritage and 
archaeological findings in urban development. Findings in the ground stop the development 
immediately.19 The main principle is then that the developer/landowner has to pay the costs of 
both the delay in the project and the archaeological investigation conducted by the local 
museum. If the findings are so important to Danish history that it is necessary to keep it and 
keep it on the spot, the land will be acquired by the Heritage Agency of Denmark.  
 
The developer/landowner can minimize his risk by asking (and paying) the local museum to 
screen the development area prior to development.20 To sum up, the screening prior to 
development is the developers/landowners’ cost – unless it is a small screening less than 5000 
m2 (Buch, A.V. & Møller, J. (eds.) 2005, ss. 454-455). Any costs caused by delays are the 
developers/landowners21. Who shall pay for the archaeological investigation – if such 
becomes necessary – depends on whether a screening has been done or not. If the 
developers/landowners have requested a screening it is the local museum/Heritage Agency 
that pays. If they have not requested a screening it is the developers/landowners’ cost. 
 
5.2. Preparation of the development area with regard to future land use 
Almost all buildings are connected to common supply networks (heat, power and water 
supply etc.) in Denmark. Only in the countryside some of these common services are not 
offered. In urban development areas such common services are always offered, and through 
regulation in binding local plans municipalities can even demand new buildings to be 
connected to common services.  
 
                                                      
14 The Danish Act on Polluted Soil (LBK nr. 282 af 22/03/2007) § 50 and Statutory order on notification and 
documentation when moving soil (BEK nr. 1479 af 12/12/2007). 
15 The Danish Act on Polluted Soil (LBK nr. 282 af 22/03/2007) §§ 3-5. 
16 The Danish Act on Polluted Soil (LBK nr. 282 af 22/03/2007) § 6 and § 8. 
17 The Danish Act on Polluted Soil (LBK nr. 282 af 22/03/2007) § 8 subsection 4. 
18 The Danish Museum Act (LBK nr. 1505 af 14/12/2006). 
19 The Danish Museum Act (LBK nr. 1505 af 14/12/2006) § 27 subsection 2. 
20 The Danish Museum Act (LBK nr. 1505 af 14/12/2006) §§ 25-26. 
21 The Danish Museum Act (LBK nr. 1505 af 14/12/2006) § 27 subsection 5. 
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The supply of electricity, water and district heating is usually offered by private “utility 
companies” – which are sometimes owned by municipalities. These companies pay – at first – 
the costs of cables and pipelines when the preparation of land takes place. Whenever a 
building is connected to the supply network the developer/landowner pays a connection fee – 
and thus, when all properties/households are connected the cables and pipelines are financed. 
The utility companies set a yearly price for both the consumptions fees and the connection 
fees. 
 
The district heating is a bit different. There is still a connection fee for the landowner, but in 
addition the developers/landowners can be imposed the cost of the main pipeline in the 
development area. On top of this there is a consumption fee, which beside the actual 
consumption also reserves some for renovation work.  
 
Also the supply of sewage systems is a bit different, since the size of connection fee is 
regulated directly in the legislation (app. 42.000 DKK)22. The sewage systems are supplied by 
the municipality, and are – due to the fixed low23 fee – partly paid for by the 
developer/landowner through consumptions fees and the connection fees and partly financed 
by the local municipality. (Christensen, 2008) 
 
As it appears the regulation of common supply is rather fragmented, but developer/landowner 
can usually calculate the costs in advance. 
 
Development of roads and public spaces are, however, even more differentiated when it 
comes to the distribution of costs. There are two possible types of roads within a development 
area: Private roads and public roads. Private roads are typically internal roads – they are 
owned by the landowner who also pays for them. The public roads are typically the bigger 
roads leading into the area – they are owned by the municipality who also pays for them, at 
least the first time round. The municipality does, however, have two options to impose some 
public road-costs on the developer/landowner through: 1) Development agreements and 2) 
road levies.  
 
The developer/landowner can make a development agreement with the municipality if the 
developer requests it voluntarily24. It is not possible to force it upon the 
developer/landowner.25 However, a light pressure can be put on the developer as the 
municipality can refuse to provide the necessary planning and planning permission, if the 
municipality will not be able to prioritise the necessary road development in the municipal 
budget.   
 
                                                      
22 The Danish Act on Payment for Wastewater Treatment ( LBK nr. 281 af 22/03/2007) § 2. 
23 The fee is low compared to the real costs, and is decided in national politics. 
24 The Danish Planning Act (LBK nr. 1027 af 20/10/2008) § 21b. 
25 The fact that the development agreements are voluntary protects the land owners against “hidden” (i.e. 
unlawful) tax charging. In other words, municipalities are prohibited to charge landowners for infrastructure 
costs which are normally defrayed and budgeted by the local government. Only when the urban development 
results in extraordinary expenses, these expenses can be charged the landowners – i.e. when a higher quality or 
standard of the planned infrastructure in an area is to be achieved (cf. § 21b, subsection 2 no. 1); or when 
accelerating the local planning (cf. § 21b, subsection 2 no. 2); or when the development opportunities are 
changed or extended (cf. § 21b, subsection 2 no. 3), cf. (Sørensen M. T. and Aunsborg C., 2008).  
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The other possibility, “road levies”, is given by the road legislation26. This gives the 
municipality the option to impose landowners with “direct access” to the public road some of 
the costs of making and maintaining the road27. “Direct access” also includes public roads 
leading into a housing area that – despite also used by “outsiders” – are primarily used by the 
landowners in the area28. 
 
6. The supply of social infrastructure 
 
Inevitably, development of a new urban areas – especially housing areas – will have an 
impact on the community and the services provided by the municipality in the community 
such as kindergarten, schools etc. If schools or kindergartens are to be enlarged as a result of 
housing development it is considered a traditional municipal task to develop – and pay for – 
such social infrastructure. 
 
When the municipality makes its planning it is natural to take the whole economy into 
consideration – meaning also to consider how the development will affect the supply of 
services (kindergartens, schools etc.). As the municipality has limited funds the municipal 
council needs to do so. (Bogason, P. et al. 2008, p. 58) 
 
Social infrastructure costs cannot be imposed upon developers/landowners due to the tradition 
that such infrastructure is in Denmark always defrayed and budgeted by the local government. 
The Danish regulations also reflects this since there is no law – or the like – that gives the 
municipality the option of imposing the costs of public institutions on the 
developer/landowners when the municipality develops an area. Quite the reverse, as 
landowners by the Basic Law are protected against “hidden” tax charging, i.e. municipalities 
are prohibited to charge landowners for infrastructure costs which are normally defrayed and 
budgeted by the local government. 
 
However, and quite opposite, a municipality can in a local plan regulate that “the production 
of or connection with common facilities located within or without the area governed by the 
plan as a condition for starting to use new buildings”29. Common facilities normally refer to 
technical infrastructure described above, cable-TV arrangements, common houses with 
laundry etc. and parking spaces within the area and so on – and this is also the way it is 
administered in practice. However, it is explicitly mentioned in the explanatory notes of the 
planning legislation30 that kindergartens etc. are included. This extension of the interpretation 
is considered to be very hard to use – if ever used (Sørensen, M.T. 2007, p. 283). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
26 The Danish Road Levy Act (LBK nr. 392 af 22/05/2008). 
27 The Danish Road Levy Act (LBK nr. 392 af 22/05/2008) § 6. 
28 The Danish Road Levy Act (LBK nr. 392 af 22/05/2008) § 6 subsection 2. 
29 The Danish Planning Act (LBK nr. 1027 af 20/10/2008) § 15 subsection 2 bullet 11.  
30 The legislative history of act no. 168/1974 (§13, stk. 6). 
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7. The construction of buildings  
 
The construction of buildings is the developer/landowner’s cost and they also gain the 
possible profit. The municipality only serves as the permit-giving authority31. According to 
the Danish building law the developer/landowner needs a building permit before construction 
and a permit (i.e. a commissioning certificate) to utilize the building when it has been built.32 
It costs a small fee to apply for the building permit – but in comparison to the building cost 
etc. it is insignificant. 
 
8. Overview 
 
Looking at the distribution of profits and costs from the point of view that the municipality 
cannot demand a share of the profits or impose costs on the developer/landowner without  
being based in legislation in accordance with the Danish Basic Law, the distribution adds up 
to the following:  
 
The developer/landowner gets the profit, and the municipality’s only option if they want to 
obtain some of the profit, is to become landowner themselves by acquiring land early and 
strategically - either through free sale or through compulsory purchase.  
 
Who gets the profit of a particular development project? 
 
 
Developer/Landowner Municipality 
Idea and throughout planning 
process 
(the value of the project idea 
and the value of building rights 
– including the expectation of 
such) 
 
X 
 
(X) 
(If the municipality 
acquires the develop-
ment area strategically – 
i.e. before the local plan 
is provided) 
 
Preparation of land 
 
X 
 
(only if the municipality 
is landowner when the 
preparation of land takes 
place) 
 
Construction of buildings X 
 
 
 
The municipality can choose another strategy – to impose as many costs as possible on the 
developer/landowner. The municipality does however only have the costs of the planning 
process and of the construction of public roads to impose on the developer/landowner – the 
rest is already the developers/landowners’ cost. Both in the case with the costs of the planning 
process and of the construction of public roads the voluntary developer agreements are an 
option. The municipality does have a second option concerning the costs of roads; road levies. 
                                                      
31 But – as mentioned above - a light pressure can be put on the developer to enter into a development agreement 
as the municipality can refuse to provide the necessary planning and planning permission.  
32 The Danish Building Act (LBK nr. 452 af 24/06/1998) § 16. 
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It would however be a special case if the municipality is totally free of costs. The big picture 
is that the developer carries the costs. 
 
Who carries the costs? 
 
 
Developer/Landowner Municipality 
Purchase of land 
 
X  
Planning (X) 
(maybe through 
development 
agreement) 
 
X 
Preparation of land 
‐ Archaeological 
investigation  
‐ Polluted soil 
‐ District heating 
 
 
‐ Electricity  
 
‐ Water supply 
 
‐ Sewage systems 
 
‐ Roads 
 
 
X 
 
X 
(X) 
(Connection fee 
/development fee) 
X 
(Connection fee) 
X 
(Connection fee) 
X 
(Connection fee) 
X 
(private roads – always; 
public roads - 
developer 
agreement/road levies) 
 
 
 
 
 
(*) 
 
 
* 
 
* 
 
(X*) 
(see chapter 5.2) 
X 
(public road) 
Social infrastructure 
(note that this is not technically a 
part of the development project, 
but a service provided by the 
municipality as a traditional 
‘municipality task’) 
 
 (X) 
(not technical a part of 
the development 
project) 
Construction of buildings X 
 
 
* The costs of the cables and pipelines in the supply network are financed through connection fees, but are 
at first paid and build by the utility companies. 
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9. Evaluation of the Danish profit and cost distribution system 
 
To evaluate the Danish profit and cost distribution system it has to be held up against certain 
criteria based on “good administrative practice”. In Denmark as in many other countries, a 
good distribution system must at least be predictable and specific in its regulations and have a 
transparent process. This concerns the “system-technical side” and not necessarily what is 
fair. Both issues are discussed further below, however, with clear emphasis on the former 
rather than the latter.  
 
Is the Danish system predictable and specific in its regulations, and does it have a transparent 
process? As shown the distribution system is regulated throughout a whole range of different 
laws, and the main part of the costs are imposed on the developer/landowner and at different 
times throughout the development process. To outsiders this may not appear very transparent. 
On the other hand, it is clearly regulated and when the local authorities are given competences 
it is explicitly based legally. The different costs are calculable since the models for calculating 
fees are public available and the parameters for calculating fees are to a wide extend known 
beforehand – often through the municipalities websites. This is quite transparent, at least for 
those who know the system.  
 
One exception is the costs on public roads, where the developer cannot beforehand predict his 
share of the total costs. But throughout the distribution system it is not possible for the 
municipality to negotiate a “bigger piece of the cake” by imposing extra costs. The 
municipality can for instance not “sell” the planning permissions “at the highest” price33, and 
the developer/landowner cannot “bribe” the municipality to adopt a certain planning. Both 
would conflict with at transparent distribution and could undermine the public’s trust and 
confidence in the planning system (Harvey, J & Jowsey, E, 2004, pp. 412-413). 
 
Another question is if the distribution system is fair? The present system is illustrated in the 
figure below, which is also the starting point for the following discussion. As the system is 
now, the developer/landowner “gets it all” (more or less) – profit, risk and costs. But the 
municipality contributes to some of the profit, at least the part that is caused by planning and 
building rights, as it can be seen in the upper part of the figure. Thus, the municipality is 
providing a value increase on private land, and the actual owner gets the profit. On the other 
hand, he “loses” if the municipality makes a planning decision which decreases land value34. 
The figure also shows that the developer pays for some of the services provided by the 
municipality – sewage, part of the roads and so on.  It could be argued that this is additional 
expenditure to the municipality, and therefore, it would be fair to impose these costs on the 
developer/landowner. The same arguments could apply for the social infrastructure. On the 
other hand, the municipality is (by tradition or law) obligated to supply the community with 
                                                      
33 However - as mentioned above - when the development opportunities are changed or extended the 
municipality can (at least indirectly by putting at light pressure on the developer/landowner) charge extra-
ordinary expenses to upgrade the technical infrastructure (cf. Danish Planning Act § 21b, subsection 2 no. 3).  
34 However, there is a ”safety net” for the landowner if the land will be designated for public use (road, 
recreational area, etc.), cf. Danish Planning Act § 48: ”When a local plan or a town planning by-law reserves a 
property for public use, the owner may demand that the municipality assume ownership of the property and pay 
compensation”. 
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the majority of these services. Such infrastructure is in Denmark always defrayed and 
budgeted by the local government. 
Figure showing the distribution of profits and costs in urban development projects. The circles are placed 
schematically for illustrative purposes and do not have foundation in empirically data.  
 
An example on this discussion could be a typical one-family housing development at the edge 
of the city: The municipality plans the area and the developer/landowner develops the area – 
covering most of the costs, having the risk and getting the profit of it. The municipality is then 
left with some costs to roads, planning and the development area’s impact on the existing 
social infrastructure. Several Danish municipalities are struggling with their economy, and 
therefore also with the illustrated costs. The area does of course also produce extra tax money 
(property tax and income tax from the new inhabitants), but that does of course not solve the 
funding problems around the time of the development. The example points towards letting the 
municipality impose more costs on the developer/landowner. But if the development project 
appears unattractive because of absence of the necessary municipal infrastructure investments, 
and thus not profitable, the landowner/developer would properly not develop at all – a 
situation most municipalities would like to avoid. Therefore, most municipalities in Denmark 
actually develop the infrastructure without complaints, because they later on gain (property 
and income taxes) what thy have “lost” in the first time round. 
 
9.1 Is there a need for improvement in the Danish system? 
Keeping in mind that the distribution of profits and costs should be “predictable, specific and 
transparent”, and taking the existing system into consideration, it is a better solution to keep 
the focus on the costs as it is today. In the present system it is only the costs related direct to 
the actual development that can be imposed on the developer/landowner – which excludes 
costs for social infrastructure. Keeping it to the costs that is directly related to the actual 
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development is a secure way to “keep it simple” and to keep it fairly measurable and 
predictable.  
 
There is, however, one troublesome issue – public roads and the municipality’s possibilities to 
pass on the costs to the developer/landowner – which is not as predictable as the others. The 
developer/landowner can engage in a development agreement and through this they can pay 
the costs of roads that exceed the normal standard of roads – the extra costs. This is clearly 
stated in the Danish Planning Act. The municipality can, however, go beyond this through 
road levies. Both parties would be better off if the option of development agreements were 
extended, and if the option for road levies where minimised. Not necessarily to change the 
distribution of costs between the public and private parties, but to make it more transparent 
and predictable.   
 
10. Conclusion 
 
The Danish system for distributing the profits and costs in urban development has a 
fragmented foundation in the entire planning and environmental regulation system. To fully 
understand the system it is necessary for the developer/landowners, and for that matter the 
municipalities, to have a wide insight in the system’s considerable amount of legislation. 
When knowing the system for distribution of profits and costs it is in general transparent and 
predictable. There are, however, some uncertainty concerning public roads and the 
distribution of their costs.  
 
The analysis shows that more or less all profits and costs go to the developer although parts of 
both profits and costs might be the municipalities’ rightful gain/loss. The Danish system for 
distribution of profits and costs are in that sense “double wrong” – at least under a narrow 
project development perception. On the other hand and in a broader view, usually 
municipalities will later on gain what they have lost in the first time round: Municipalities will 
gain from mainly new income and property taxes. Whether this distribution – which actually 
is functioning despite not easy to handle (neither for municipalities nor 
developers/landowners) – should be changed is in the end a political question. A question 
beyond this paper to answer! 
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